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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
FAY I. PIXTONf 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE CO. OF BLOOMINGTON, 
ILLINOIS, and INTERNATIONAL 
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
CASE No.900119 
Priority 16 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
FAY I. PIXTON 
INTRODUCTION 
This reply brief addresses points raised in 
respondent's brief and attempts to clarify the facts and 
issues presented in this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Fay I. Pixton, seeks a reversal of the 
Order and Judgment of the District Court granting 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. Such a reversal 
would enable Plaintiff to proceed in an action against 
Defendant on a claim of bad faith and fraud. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO 
PURSUE HER CLAIMS FOR BAD 
FAITH AND FRAUD 
Plaintiff by this Appeal is not seeking additional 
damages as a result of the actions of Davies and Hothan. 
That claim was settled for $7,500.00. Plaintiff seeks 
damages against State Farm for impairing her ability to 
effectively settle her case personally without the use of 
counsel. This right to settle her third party claim was 
adversely affected by State Farm's lack of good faith and 
fair dealing during the payment of PIP benefits. 
Defendant's argument that there is no privity of contract 
between the parties is an incorrect statement. 
Defendant in its Argument on Point I cites 
numerous authorities dealing with first-party claims and 
third party claims and the duties arising from those 
relationships. Beck's affidavit in this case dealt as much 
with the first party claim as the third party claim. His 
affidavit recognized the "conflict of interest" where both 
parties are insured by the same company and only one 
adjuster is assigned to handle both claims. This 
arrangement was the choice of State Farm not the Plaintiff. 
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Further, his affidavit dealt with the involvement of IRA, 
non-disclosure, and the mis-characterization of IRA's 
charges as file expenses. The District Court should have 
viewed this evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff; 
however by completely rejecting the affidavit he committed 
reversible error. 
Also, Defendant appears to be arguing that 
insurance bad faith can only be based on a contract theory 
to the exclusion of a tort theory. In annotation #3 Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) the 
following language by the Court demonstrates a viable cause 
of action in tort or fraud may be filed in first party cases: 
"We recognize that in some cases the acts 
constituting a breach of contract may also 
result in breaches of duty that are in-
dependent of the contract and may give 
rise to causes of action in tort. Hal 
Taylor Assoc, v. Union America, 657 P.2d 
at 750; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. 
Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example, the 
law of this state recognizes a duty to 
refrain from intentionally causing severe 
emotional distress to others. Samms v. Eccles, 
11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961). Thus, 
intentional and outrageous conduct by an 
insurer against an insured, coupled with a 
failure to bargain, could conceivably result 
in tort liability independent of (and concurrent 
with) liability for breach of contract. 
Additionally, the facts that give rise to a 
breach of the duty to bargain in good faith 
could also amount to fraudulent activity, 
rendering an insurer independently liable for 
damages flowing from the fraud. See Wetherbee 
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v, United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. 2d 921, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 764 (1968) . Also, under various 
unfair practices acts, there may be 
statutory requirements that give rise to 
independent causes of action. E.g., U.C.A., 
1953, §§ 31-27-1 to-24". 
How could the Court rule that there was no 
conflict of interest on the part of Felix Jensen handling 
the claims for both parties, where it appears from the cases 
and the affidavit of Mr. Beck that its customary in the 
insurance industry to have two adjusters handle such cases? 
If the District Court was obligated to view the evidence in 
a light most favorable to appellant, how could it disregard 
Beck's affidavit? The fact that the issues involved with 
the sums paid by State Farm to IRA could have been resolved 
in Judge Frederick's Court, should not be a basis for 
denying appellant the right to establish State Farm's bad 
faith or fraud. 
A jury could reasonably infer "bad faith11 and 
"fraud" from the evidence that State Farm's actions in 
mischaracterizing specials, not advising Pixton about using 
nurses as non-testimonial experts preparing for trial, not 
advising Pixton about IRA's actual function of minimizing 
medical expenses as opposed to providing rehabilitation and 
not offering the $7,500.00 based upon $871.51 specials when 
it first offered the $2,500.00 in 1984, rather than some 
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five (5) years later. The liability in this case was 
undeniable and clear and the facts known to State Farm at 
the time it offered $2f500.00 to Plaintiff were identical to 
those 5 years later when $7,500.00 was offered. This delay 
was clearly unreasonable based upon the foregoing facts. 
POINT II 
SETTLEMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
AGAINST DAVIES AND HOTHAN DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER 
The Defendant's claim that Plaintiff was given the 
information concerning the cost of IRA's services more than 
one year prior to her settlement with Davies and Hothan is 
partially true. Plaintiff was given copies of the various 
checks paid by State Farm to IRA but the services for which 
payments were made were not provided. In order to determine 
whether the payments were actually "file expenses" rather 
than "medical specials" the nature of the services had to be 
identified. 
It was because of State Farm's complete control of 
the first and third party claims that it was able to 
mis-characterize the IRA payments to the detriment of 
Plaintiff. State Farm insured both Plaintiff and Defendant 
and decided to handle the claim using one adjuster contrary 
to accepted insurance practice. That is of course, if 
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Beck's affidavit in this case is given any effect. 
In an action for failure to settle within the 
policy limits, the insurance company is charged with acting 
in a fiduciary capacity as an attorney in fact representing 
the insured's interest in litigation. The company's 
interest comes into conflict with that of the insured's 
while representing him; and arguably, acting in its own 
interests to the detriment of the insured's interest while 
acting in such a fiduciary capacity is a tort. 
In the present case, State Farm undertook the 
fiduciary duty to represent the insured's interest by not 
appointing two adjusters. It did in the course of 
representing Plaintiff violate its fiduciary duty arising 
out of sole control of the settlement. This was true at 
least until Pixton obtained independent counsel, but by then 
the damage had been done. The IRA employees had completed 
their task of minimizing medicals and the specials could 
then be mis-characterized as "file expenses". 
There is in the record no factual or legal basis 
upon which to make a finding or conclusion that Plaintiff 
waived her claims of "bad faith" and "fraud" against State 
Farm. The settlement of the Davies and Hothan case occurred 
June 13, 1989, the day of trial. The affirmative defense in 
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Defendant's answer dated April 1, 1987 and the second answer 
dated May 23, 1989, referred to Plaintiff's conduct not the 
settlement. Obviously, based upon the dates the defense was 
raised it had to refer to actions or conduct that occurred 
prior to the settlement. If State Farm had intended the 
dismissal of this action it could have demanded that as part 
of the $7f500.00 settlement but that was not done nor did 
Plaintiff intend such a result. 
On page 6 of respondent's brief, respondent states 
that Plaintiff failed to press for a ruling at trial in Judge 
Frederick's Court. Plaintiff filed a motion just prior to 
trial in that case to have the Court review the checks paid 
by State Farm to IRA to determine their admissibility. The 
Court refused to hear the motion without giving any reason. 
The Plaintiff could not attempt to introduce the checks 
because they contained the insurance company's name and 
contained no information about services provided. Plaintiff 
felt constrained to accept the settlement because of those 
procedural problems. In any event, the $7,500.00 settlement 
based upon $871.51 medicals was reasonable. At that time 
Plaintiff agreed to accept $7,500.00 as a settlement of her 
claim against Davies and Hothan. There was no agreement to 
dismiss this case against State Farm. 
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It was because of State Farm's actions of claiming 
the IRA employees as non-testimonial experts that appellant 
in this case was unable to obtain discovery. As stated on 
page 5 of respondent's brief, on May 24, 1988, counsel for 
Davies and Hothan sent copies of drafts from State Farm to 
IRA, but those drafts did not identify the services 
rendered. In this way, State Farm effectively denied Pixton 
access to information she needed not only to settle her 
claim but to prosecute the trial itself. This action by 
State Farm clearly was structured to protect its interests 
over those of its insured and could be found by a jury to 
constitute bad faith. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT WAIVED 
ANY CLAIM OF ERROR ON THE 
DISMISSAL OF HER THIRD 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defendant's statement that Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint contained various unfounded allegations of fraud 
is incorrect. The affidavits of Plaintiff and Beck must, 
for purposes of Summary Judgment, be taken as true. 
Consequently, if the affidavits as filed were proper in all 
respects and admissible Defendant's assertion fails. 
Plaintiff failed to brief the issue of fraud and 
did so in part because the District Court in the Order For 
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Summary Judgment did not make mention of the Cause of Action 
In Fraud. However, the exact argument for reversing the 
District Court's Order regarding the contract and good faith 
causes of action applies to the claim for fraud. There were 
genuine issues of material facts which precluded summary 
judgment. 
POINT IV 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF MILTON Q. BECK 
DID RAISE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
In the typical third party claim there is no 
privity of contract. However, this case involving Pixton 
obviously differs from the typical third party claim. In 
the first instance, this case is no different than the Beck 
v. Farmers case. When that case turned into an uninsured 
motorist claim the insured's position was identical to that 
of Pixton and State Farm. Why should this case be treated 
differently than Beck v. Farmers supra? Mr. Beck's 
affidavit and that of Pixton clearly dealt with the actions 
of State Farm during the resolution and payment of PIP 
benefits. At that point there was obviously privity of 
contract. Defendant completely disregards the Plaintiff's 
affidavit and misstates the facts concerning Beck's 
affidavit. 
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CONCLUSION 
A reasonable expectation of Pixton from her 
contract with State Farm was to have her PIP benefits paid. 
Once those benefits are paid does State Farm's duty under 
the contract end? Is she not entitled to be provided with 
any information needed to settle her third party claim 
against Davies? If the services provided by IRA were found 
by a jury to be medical expenses and not file expenses, 
wouldn't it follow logically that State Farm had an 
obligation to provide her with that information so she could 
intelligently assess the value of her case? Would not the 
mischaracterization of these expenses and or State Farm's 
refusal to provide them to Pixton constitute bad faith? 
The jury could find that State Farm's conduct of 
delaying payment, mischaracterizing medical specials, 
failing to provide copies of bills paid under PIP for claims 
against the third party, failure to allow Pixton and her 
attorney to characterize the bills, failure to inform Pixton 
that the purpose of obtaining the medical release was in 
preparation for defense of the third party claim and not 
treatment, constituted intentional and outrageous acts, 
justifying an award of consequential and punitive damages. 
The foregoing actions of State Farm are not just 
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failures to perform obligations under its contract with 
Pixton but are violations of duties set forth by statute and 
custom in the industry. Consequently, Pixton should not be 
limited to damages recoverable in contract. The District 
Court's Summary Judgment should be reversed and the 
Plaintiff allowed to proceed with her claim for "bad faith" 
and "fraud". 
Respectfully submitted this £ / day of 
/7uyi*X^ 1990, 
ftATT BILJANIC>*Y^ 
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